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Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2892 
. ALPHONSE CUSTODIS CHIMNEY CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, AND UNITED STATES FIDELITY 
.A.ND GUARANTY COMPANY, Appellants, 
versus 
JUAN CRUZ MOLINA, Appellee. 
PETITION FOR APPEAL. 
To the Honorable, the Chief Justice and .Associate Justices of 
~ the. Su.prenie Court of .Appeals of Virginia: 
Your petitioners., Alphonse Custodis Chimney Construction 
Company and United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company 
respectfully represent that they are aggrieved by a final 
award of compensation by the Industrial Commission of Vir-
ginia, entered by the full Commission on June 7th, 1944, on 
claim No. 633-043, Case of Juan Francisco Cruz, deceased, 
wherein Juan Cruz Molina was the claimant and your peti-
tioners were the Employer and Insurer, respectively. 
· The hearing Commissioner made his award of compensa-
tion to the claimant, amounting to $3,552.00 in gross on May 
11th, 1944, and an application for review by the full Com-
2* · mission was made by •petitioners on May 13th., 1944, the 
case was reviewed May 29th, 1944, and the final award 
affirming and adopting the award of the hearing Commis-
sioner was entered June 7th, 1944. 
Your petitioners file herewith a transcript of the record in 
said case, including· the evidence and they pray that they 
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may be granted an appeal, and that the said award may be 
reversed. 
' 
MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMIS-
SION. 
Juan Francisco Cruz, a resident of Puerto Rico, and an 
employee of Alphonse Custodis Chimney Construction Com-
pany was working on the erection of a chimney at Hampton, 
Virg'inia. On the 3rd day of August, 1942, he fell from the 
chimney and received injuries from which he died almost 
immediately. Juan Cruz Molina., also a resident of Puerto 
Rico, filed a claim with the Industrial Commission of Virginia 
for an award of compensation on the grounds he was the de-
pendent father of the deceased. 
Petitioners appeared and admitted that Juan F. Cruz died 
from personal injuries by accident which arose out of, and 
in the course of his employment and that his average weekly 
wag~ was $48.80. A deposition of the claimant was taken in 
Puerto Rico, August 12, 1943, and later filed. On February 
26th, 1944, said claimant was examined in reference to his 
deposition formerly taken. Thereupon briefs were filed on 
hehalf of the respective parties. The matter was heard by 
Honorable Parke P. Deans, wpo on the 11th day of May, 1944, 
made an award of compensation aa follows: 
"To Juan Cruz Molina., $11.84 per week payable every 
four weeks, beginning August 3, 1942, and to continue 
3* for a *period of three hundred weeks, unless subsequent 
conditions require a modification. In addition to the 
compensation, the defendant will pay the burial expenses as 
well as all com't costs.'' • # • 
... t\.pplication for a review of said award by the full Com-
mission was duly made by petitioners and the case was re-
viewed May 29th, 1944, and the final award complained of 
was entered on June 7th, 1944. 
ASSIGNMEN~ OF ERRORS. 
(1) 'rhe Commission erred in entering an award of com-
pensation to the claimant for a sum in excess of the limitation 
of amount awardable in such cases under section 39, Virginia 
Workmen's Compensation Act-section 1887 (39) Code of 
Virginia ( 1942). 
(2) 'rhe Commission erred in entering an award of com-
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pensation to claimant contrary to the law in such cases made 
and provided. 
(3) 'rhe Commission erred in entering an award of com-
pensation to claimant for a sum in excess of $657.54 payable 
as provided by law. 
( 4) The Commission erred in refusing to limit the amount 
payable for burial expenses. 
( 5) The award is contrary to the law and the evidence. 
THE QUESTION INVOLVED. 
The question involved is this : 
Is the award contrary to the law and the evidence and more 
especially is it contrary to the provisions of section 39 of 
4• the •Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act which places 
a limitation of the amount of compensation that can be 
awarded to dependents who were not citizens of, and who 
did not reside at the time of the accident in the United States 
or Dominion of Canada Y 
ARGUMENT. 
The petitioners contend th~t., _under the law in this and 
similar cases, the amount of compensation shall not exceed 
one thousand dollars. The errors assigned will be discussed 
together. 
The headnotes to section 39 of the Virginia Workmen's 
Compensation Act are as follows: Death from Injury-Burial 
Expenses-Dependents. The last sentence in this section 
says: 
'' If the employee does not leave dependent, citizens of and 
residing at the time of the accident in the United States or 
Dominion of Canada, the amount of compensation shall not 
in any case exceed one thousand dollars." (Ital. sup.) 
The claimant resided in Puerto Rico at the time of the ac-
cident and death of Juan Francisco Cruz and now resides on 
said island. He contends he is a citizen of the United States 
and since Puerto Rico is an insular possession of the United 
States he was residing in the United States at the time of the 
accident. 
In our brief filed with the Commission, we conceded that, 
under the Act of Congress known as the Jones Act, which 
became effective March 2nd, 1917, citizenship was bestowed 
upon certain residents of the island ( 5 F. C. A. Title 48 sec-
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tion 733 b) but we also insisted and now most respectfully 
insist that, under said section 39, the employee's dependent 
must not only be a citizen of the United States., but he 
5"" must be residing in the United States or ""Dominion of 
Canada at the time of the accident to be entitled to com-
pensation in excess of $1,000.00. 
Practically the first nine pages of the opinion of the hear-
ing Commissioner, is devoted to a discussion of claimant's 
citizenship, a point, as stated above, we conceded in our brief. 
Section 39 of the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act 
and more especially that part thereof hereinabove quoted is, 
we submit, clear, plain, precise and unambiguous. 
Puerto Rico has never been .and is not nuw incorporated 
in the United States. The name Puerto Rico, as used in the 
Federal statutes., '' shall apply to the island of Puerto Rico 
and to the adjacent islands belonging to the United States 
and waters of those islands; • • •" (5 F. C. A., Title 48, sec-
tion 731) ( ital. sup.). This land or territorv is nothing more 
than Insular Possessions of the United States, and, as said 
by the Supreme Court of the United States in cases herein-
after cited, these insular possessions have never been made a 
part of the_."Union"-" A part of the American family". 
Our position on the construction of sec. 39 is similar t<, 
that taken by the appellee in the case of Teniple v. City o.f 
Petersburg, 182 Va. 418. In that case the court was called 
upon to ascertain the proper meaning of section 56 of the 
Code of 1942 which prov.ides, in part, as follows: 
''No cemetery shall be hereafter established within the cor~ 
porate limits of any city or town; nor shall any cemetery be 
established within 250 yards of any residence without the 
consent of the owner of the legal and equitable title of such 
residence ; • • •. '' 
On page 422 it is said: '' The position of the appellee i~ 
that the word, 'established,' has such a clear and precisi 
6* meaning that no •question of statutory construction 
arises. That the statute provides that no cemetery shall 
be '.hereafter established' in a City or Town., and that this 
language does not mean that a cemetery already established 
shall not be hereafter enlarged. To hold otherwise would be 
not to construe the statute, but in effect, to amend it." (Ital. 
sup.) 
On pages 422 and 423 the court said: 
"It is elementary that the ultimate aim of the rules of in-
terpretation is to ascertain the intention of the legislature. 
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in the enactment of a statute, and that intention, when dis:-
covered, must prevail. If, however, the intention of the legis-
lature is perfoctly clear from the language used, rules of con-
struction ure not to be applied "\Ve are not allowed to con-
strue that which hur no need of construction.'' 
"If the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, 
a11cl its 111ea11ing perfectly clear and definite, effect must be 
given to it regardless of what courts think of its wisdom or 
polic·y. In f:mcb cases courts must find the meaning wit4in 
the statute itself.'' See cases -0ited. · 
"In Com1,1mnrealth v. Sa!fl,derson, .170 Va. 33, 195 S. E. 516, 
we quott~d with approval from Saville v. Virginia Ry., etc., 
Co., 114 Va. 444, 76 S. E. 954, 957, this statement of the rule: 
" iJt is contended that the construction insisted upon by 
the plaintiff in error is violative of the spirit or reason of the 
law. The argument would seem to concede that the conten-
tion is within the letter of the law. We hear a great deal 
about the spirit of the law, but the duty of this court is not 
to make law, but to construe it; not to wrest its letter from its 
plain meaning in order to conform to what is conceived to be 
its spirit, in order to subserve and promote some principle of 
justice and equality, which it is claimed the letter of the:: 
7• law has violated. It is our dutv to take •the words which 
the legislature has seen fit to ~employ and give to them, 
their usual and ordinary signification, and having thus ascer-
tained the legislative intent, to give effect to it, unless it 
transcends the legislative power as limited by the. Constitu-
tion'." (Ital. sup.) 
.' Iii Fairbanks, etc., Co. v. Cape Charles, sitpra, the court 
says: ''Under the distribution of powers by the Constitution, 
i.t is the function of this court to interpret and not to enact 
laws. The latter power belongs to the legislature alone''. 
May this court never depart from the rule quoted with ap-
proval from the Saville case. When it does the backbone of 
Democracy in this State will be as a ''broken reed". 
vV e respectfully submit that the words of the act, unde1 
consideration, namely, "residing at the time of the accident 
in the United States or Dominion of Canada," l1ave such a 
clear and precise meaning that no question of statutory con-
struction arises. To hold that those words include the 
"insular possessions" of the United States would not be n 
construction of the statute, but in effect, would be an amend-
ment of it. 
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We are here dealing with a State statute. The Federal 
Courts, including, of course, the Supreme Court of the United 
States is bound by the meaning or construction of the statute 
in question as interpreted by this court. Erie R. Co. v. Tonip · 
kins, 304 U. S. 64; 82 L. Ed. 1188. However, we have not 
found a Federal case which, in our judgment is authority 
against the contention of petitioners. The case of P,zterlo 
Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U. S. 253; 82 L. Ed. 235, quoted from 
at length in the opinion of the hearing Commissioner is 
not applicable to the case at bar as we shall hereinafter point 
out. 
8* *Puerto Rico is a small island about 480 miles east of 
Cuba; it is one of the West Indies, an extensive cluster 
of islands extending from Florida, in the north, to Venezuela, 
in the south; aside from Cuba, Haiti and the Dominion Re-
public., which are independent states, are possessions of Great 
Britain, France, Holland, and the United States; the United 
States, which has owned Puerto Rico since 1898, purchased 
in 1917, from Denmark, for the sum of $25,000.00, what are 
now known as the American Virgin Islands, a group of about 
fifty islands but which in the main are the islands of St. 
Thomas., St. John and St. Croix. Collier's National Encyclo-
pedia. The Hawaiian Islands, Guam and Swain Islands, to-
gether with the islands of Tutuila, lVIanua, and eastern Samoa, 
ceded to the JJnited States by certain chiefs of the island of 
Tutuila and Manna and certain other islands of the Samoan 
group are all insulal' possessions of, and under the jurisdic-
tion of the government established therein by the United 
States. 
The residents, with certain exceptions, of the Hawaiian 
Islands, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, if not the resi-
dents of aB the other islands mentioned., have been made 
citizens of the United States. 2 F. C. A., Title 8, •sections 4, 5, 
5a and 5b. vVe :are inclined to inject .at this point, the follow-
ing question: Did the Legislature of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia intend to extend to an employee's dependent, resid-
ing in those islands the same compensation payable to ·a de-
pendent residing· 1n a Statet The court will take judicial 
knowledge that ordinarily one of ·"Uncle Sam's" dollars 
would buy in some of those islands five times or more the 
goods and chattels the same dollar would .purchase in the 
States. 
9* *Neither the Foraker Act nor the Jones Act mentioned 
in the Commissioner's opinion made Puerto Rico ·''In-
corporated Territory." Congress by said acts granted the 
inhabitants limited local self government. Congress enacted 
a "Bill of rights and restrictions" for the island aforesaid; 
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Congress likewise gave the Philippine Islands ( ceded to the 
United States by the treaty of peace concluded between the 
U.S. and Spain on the 11th day of April, 1899), and the Virgin 
Islands a "Bill of rights and 1•estricti9ns''. See 5 F. C. A., 
Title 48, sections 737., 1008, and 1406g. 
"Tl1e Organic Act of April 12th, 1900 (31 U. S. St. at L. 
77c, 191), did .not incorporate Puerto Rico -into the United 
States." Balzac v. Porto Rico, 42 S. Ct. 343, 258 U. S. 298~ 
66 L. Ed. 627. . 
Mr. Chief Justice Taft delivered the opinion in the Balzac 
case. On pages 304, 305 ( 66 L. Ed., pages 630, 631 )., he said: 
" • • "'. It is well settled that these provisions for jury trial 
in criminal and civil cases apply to the ter·ritories of the 
United States' ( cases cited). ''But it-is just as clearly settled 
that they do not a.pply to territory belonging to the United 
States which has not been incorporated into the Union"'' 
(cases cited). '-'It was further settled in Downes v. Bidwell, 
182 U. S. 244, 4.5 L. Ed. 1088, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770, and con-
finned by D.orr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138, 49' L. Ed. 128, 
24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808., 1 Ann. Oas. 697, that neither the Philip-
pines nor Porto Rico was territory which had been incorpo-
rated in the Union or become a part of the United States, as 
distinguished from nier.ely belonging to it; and that the acts 
giving temporary governments to the Philippines (July 1st, 
1902, .32 Stat. at L. 691, Chap. 1369, Comp. Stat. sec. 
10• 3804, 7 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ·Ed., p. U33) and to Porto 
Rico (April 12, 1900, 31 Stat. at L. 77, Chap. 191., Comp. 
Stat. Sec. 3747, 7 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d Ed., p. 1259) had no 
such effe.ct. The Insular Oases revealed much diversity of 
opinion in this court as to the constitutional status of the 
territory .acquired by the T.reaty .of Paris (December 10th, 
1898, 30 Stat. at L. 1754') ending the Spanish ,var, but the 
Dorr case shows that the opinion of M:r. J usti-Oe White of the 
majority in Downes v. Bidwell has become the settled law of 
the court * * ~'' (Ital. sup.) On page 311, the Chief Justice 
said : ''We need not dwell on -another consideration which 
requires us not lightly to infer from acts thus easily ex-
plained on other grounds, an intention to incorporate in the 
Union these dis:tant ·ocean .communities of a different origin 
and language from those of our continental people. Incor-
poration has :aliWays :l>een a step,, and an important one, lead-
ing to statehood. ·without, 'in the slightest degree, intimating 
an opinion as to the -msdom of sueh a po'licy, ·for that is not 
our pro;vince, it is reasonable to assume that when -such a 
step is taken, it will be ;begun and taken by Congress de-
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· liberately and with a clear declaration of purpose, and not 
left a matter of mere inference or construction." The court, 
pp. 311 and 312, thereupon answers all the arguments and 
conclusion advanced by the plaintiffs in error under the act 
entitled, '' An Act to Provide a Civil Government for Porto 
Rico, and for other Purposes'' in support of their contention 
that Porto Rico is incorporated in the Union. It says: "Coun-
sel for the plaintiff in error also rely on the organization of a 
United States district court in Porto Rico~ on the allowance 
of review of the Porto Rican Supreme Court in cases 
11 * when the Constitution of the United States *is involved, 
on the statutory permission that Porto Rican youth can 
attend West Point and Annapolis Acadamies, on the author-
ized sale of United State~ stamps in the island, on the exten-
sion of revenue, navigation, immigration, national banking, 
bankruptcy, Federal employers' liability, safety appliance, 
extradition, and census laws in one way or another to Porto 
Rico. With the background of the considerations already 
stated, none of these, nor all of the11i piit together, furnish 
ground for the conclusion pressed on us." (Ital. sup.) 
The Balzac case was decided April 10th, 1922. In Febru-
ary, 1922, the case of .Alaska v. Troy was decided by the same 
court. Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the 
court. Alaska, etc., v. Troy is reported in 258 U. S. 101, 66 
L. Ed. 487. 
Mr. John Rustgard, Attorney General of Alaska,, argued 
the cause and filed a brief for appellants. One of his con-
tentions was: ''The term 'United States' as used in the Con-
stitution applies to the American Empire, and includes not 
only the various states, but also the incorporated territories; 
hence it is that the uniformity clause of sec 8, art. 1, which 
provides that all duties, imports, or excises shall be uniform 
throughout the United States, deprives Congress of power to 
discriminate for or ag·ainst any incorporated territory (ital. 
sup.) see cases listed. 
Solicitor General Beck argued the case and filed a brief for 
appellee. (The judgment was affirmed.) Mr. Beck con-
tended: "The term 'the state', 'the several states', and 'ter-
ritory' as used in the Constitution, have a precise and definite 
meaning.'' See cases cited the first of which is Downes v. Bid-
well. 
The court among other pertinent comments., on pag·e 
12* 111 ""(L. Ed., P. 489), said: "The appellants insist 
that 'State' in the preference clause includes an incor-
porated and organized territory. This word appears very 
often in the Constitution and, as generally used therein, it 
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clearly exclucles a 'territory.' To justify the broad meaning 
now suggested would require considerations more cog·ent than 
any which have been suggested.·* • ""." 
In 62 C. J., page 789, section (9) B, this is said: "v\7bile 
in its general public sense, and as sometimes used in the stat-
utes and the proceedings of the government, the w9rd 'State' 
has the larger meaning of any separate political community, 
including therein the territories, as well as those political 
communities known as states of the Union. The word 'state' 
is often used in contradistinction of 'territory'., and it is only 
in exceptional cases that the word applies to a territory. A 
distinction between 'states' and 'territories' appears to be 
implicitly recognized by the federal constitution, and usually 
at least, as used in the federal constitution, the word 'state' 
does not include territory. So also, a like distinction has been 
. recognized by the courts. "While the Organic act has sqme-
times conferred on a territory an autonomy similar to that of 
a state, the doctrine of state sovereignty does not apply to 
territories in the full sense, and while it has been said that an 
incorporated territory is as much a part of the United States 
as the states, and a territory sustains no such relations to 
the government of the United States as does a state, even 
though the territory-is incorporated into the United States, 
since the several states of the Union possess all the powers 
and attributes of independent nations, except such as they 
have deleg·ated by the Constitution to the United States, 
13,jj: which is *not the case of a territory." (Ital. sup.) See 
cases cited in footnote. 
In the Commissioner's opinion., a copy of which was fur-
nished us, this is said "Furthermore, it does not matter how 
logical this conclusion might appear, perhaps it might not 
be so convincing. Fortunately for the claimant, .the Supreme 
Court of the United States had its chance to pass over this 
issue in the far old days of the year 1900; in the leading case 
of the Delima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, from where we quote: 
" 'With the ratification of the Treatv of Peace between the 
United States and Spain, April 11, 1899, the island of Puerto 
Rico ceased to be a foreign country.' " 
Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the court in the 
Delima case. '' This case raises the single question whether 
territory acquired by the United States by ce~sion from n 
foreign power remains a 'foreign country' within the mean-
ing of the tariff laws.'' 
..-. 
10 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virgmia ·~..: '" . 
The majority opinion held Porto Rico was not a foreign 
country within the meaning· of the tariff laws. 
Mr. Justice Gray dissenting, said: "I am compelled to 
dissent from the judgment in this case. It appears to me 
irreconcilable with the unanimous opinion of this court in 
Fleming v. Page, 9 How. 603., 13 L. Ed. 276, and with the 
opinions of the majority of the .J usticcs in the case, this day 
decided, of Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244 post. 1088, 21 
Sup. Ct. Rep. 770' '. 
:Mr. Justice McKenna also disssented in an opinion in which 
l\ir. Justice Shiras and Mr. Justice 'White concurred. 
The DeLima case, supra ( 45 L. Ed. 1041), has no applica-
tion to the case at bar as petitioners do not claim Puerto Rico 
is a foreign country. We do contend however that 
14 * Puerto Rico is nothing more '-+than an insular possession 
of the United State·s,-it is not a state nor is it a terri- . 
tory-incorporated or unincorporated. 
The case of Downes v. Hid.well, 182 U.S. 244, 45 L. Ed. 1088, 
was decided the same day the DeLima case (su,pra)., was de-
cided. (May 27th, 1901.) The opinions of the respective 
Justices rendered in this case, and more especially the opin-
ion of Mr. Justice "\Vbite concurring in the majority opinion 
and in which Mr. Shiras, and Mr. Justice McKenna concurred, 
are generally enlightening·, and are as interesting reading as 
Shakespeare if you like his works, or as "Sherlock Holmes" 
if you like Mr. A. Connon Doyle's stories. 
In the opinion of Mr. Justice ·white, at page 342 (L. Ed., 
page 1127), this is said : "The result of what has been said 
is that, while in an international sense ',Porto Rico was not a 
foreign country, since it was sitbject to the sovereignty of and 
was ownecl by the United States., it was foreign to the United 
States in a domestic sense, because the island had not been 
incorporated into the United States, but was merely ap-
purtenant thereto as a possession. • * *. '' (Ital. sup.) 
·we hereinabove, said that the case of Piterto Rico v. Shell 
Co., supra (302 U. S. 253, 82 L. Ed. 235), was not applicable. 
If it be it is authoritv for the position of petitioners. 
It is quoted at length in the Commissioner's opinion but we 
are unable to find in the case the "almost literallv" tran-
scribed syllabus set out in said oninion. .. 
In this case information was filed by the district attorney 
charging respondents with entering into a conspiracy in re-
straint of trade iu violation of the local anti-trust acti passed 
by the Legislature of Puerto Rico, March 14ti, 1907. 
15* Demurrers to the •information were sustained by the 
district court on the ground that the Sherman Anti-trust 
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Act of 1890,. supplemented by the Clayton Act of 1914, cov-
ered the entire·field embraced bv the local anti-trust act and 
the latter,, therefore, was void. The Supreme Court of Puerto 
Rico accepted that view and dismissed the appeal 
The court said the single question for it to decide was 
whether the existence of sec. 3 of the Sherman Act precluded 
the adoption of the local act by the insular legislature. The 
court held that the Puerto Rico anti-trust act was valid and 
reversed the judgment. 
The pertinent provisions of the Sherman Act and the local 
act are set forth in the margin of the opinion. 
The local act provides every contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade, etc., in a town, or among the several towns of Puerto 
Rico is hereby declared to be ill~gal. The Sherman Act pro-
vides every contract, etc., in restraint of trade or commerce 
in any Territory of the United States or of the District of 
Columbia, or between States, District of Columbia, or State 
or States., etc., and foreign nations is declared illegal. 
On page 257 the court said: '' First. Section 3 of the Sher-
man Act extends to 'any territory of the United States.' The-. 
statute in case at bar does not extend to any territory. The· 
court said: 'When the Sherman Act was passed (1890) we 
had no insular dependencies.' Puerto Rico is now and was 
an insular dependency before the State statute in question 
was enacted by the Virginia Legislature.'' 
The court said: '' The only question the ref ore, is whether 
the ·word 'Territory' as used in sec. 3 of the Sherman Act, 
properly can be applied to a dependencJJ now bearing 
16* the relation to the United *States which is borne bv 
Puerto Rico''. · 
The Sherman Act deals with contracts, etc., between State 
or States, Territories, District of Columbia, or any of these 
with foreign countries. 
Of- the Balzac case, this is said : 
"In Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258.U. S. 298, 304, 305, 66 L. Ed. 
627, 630,. 631, 42 S. Ct. 343, it was held tl1at, although the. 
Sixth Amendment of the Constitution with respect to the right 
of trial by jury applied to the territories of the United States, 
it did not apply to territory belonging to the United States 
which had not been incorporated into the Union; and that 
neither the Philippines nor Porto Rico was territory which 
had been so inaorpora,ted or had becmne a part of the United 
States, as distinguished from merely belonging to it. * * *." 
(ItaJ. sup.) 
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If we understand the opinion in the Shell Co. case it sup-
ports the contention of petitioners that Puerto Rico is no 
part of the United States, nor is. it a territory,, but merely an 
island possession for which, like many of the other small 
and large islands belonging to the United States, Congress 
has passed Acts providing them with '' Civil Government and 
for Other Purposes.'' 
Thr,re is now pending in Congress two bills pertinent to the 
issue. One S. 732 is : '' To enable the people of Puerto Rico 
to form a constitution and State government and be admitted 
into the U:nion on an· equal footing with the States". The 
other S. 952 is: "To provide for the withdrawal of the 
sovereignty- of the United States over the island of Puerto 
Rico and for the recognition of its independence; * • ii". 
The Acts of Congress relating to Puerto Rico and other 
possessions not incorporated into the United States are placed 
in the Federal Code Annotated under the Title of 
16% • Territories and Insular *Possessions. See 2 F. 0. A.,, 
Title 48, Sec. 731. It will be noted further that Con-
gl'css in the acts providing for naturalization of natives and 
residents of Virgin Islands, makes a distinction between resi-
dence in the States and the islands. See F. C. A., Title 8, Sec. 
5 b (b) where it is said: '' All natives of the Virgin Islands 
of the United States who, on January 17, 1917, resided in 
thos~ islands, and are now residing in those islands or in the 
United States or Puerto Rico, and who are not citizens or 
subjects of any foreign country; and '"' * * ". 
,ve are here concerned with the interpretation of a Vir-
gi~ia stntute. We repeat the following statements of this 
court made in the Temple case: 
'• * 
0 
e If, however, the intention of the legislature is per-
fectly cleal' from the language used, rules of construction are 
not to be applied. We are not allowed to construe that which 
has no need of construction.'' · 
In Michie '"s Digest of Virginia and West Virginia Reports, 
Vol. 9, page 35, sec. 33, headnote "Construction E..iccluded 
where none needed", this is said: 
''It is not permitted to interpret that which has no need of 
interpretation._ When an act is expressed in clear and precise 
terms-when the sense is manifest and leads to nothing ab-
surd-there can be no reason not to adopt the sense which 
it naturally presents.'' 
• 
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Seen long ·list of cases listed in support of the text. 
17* *Had the legislature intended to extend the payment 
of the same amount to dependents residing in the 
islands belonging to the United States as is granted to de-
pendents residing in the United States, it would have said so, 
as it did in act to provide for the extradition of persons of un-
sound mind. Acts 1920, Chap. 341, approved March 19, 1920 
(pages 511, 512). It says: 
'' * * * The word 'state' wherever used in this act shall in-
clude States, territories, districts and insular and other pos-
sessions of the United States. * * *. '' 
In Michie 's Digest-Permanent Supplement, Vol. 6, page 
264, sec. 5, this is said : 
"The Workmen's Compensation Law is remedial in its 
nature, and must be given a liberal construction to accom-
plish the purpose intended.'' See cases listed. This fol-
lows: 
. "Liberal construction does not imply strained construc-
tion, though in case of doubt, the Supreme Court of Appeals 
construction of compens·ation statutes should favor injured 
employee or his dependents." (119 "\V. Va. 581.) "Where 
language of compensation statutes is plain, it should be given 
its customary meaning. Id.'' 
'' The provisions of the act cannot be extended by constru.c-
tion so as to cover persons or occupations not within its scope 
and intent.," citing Bmnber v. Norfolk, 138 Va. 26; Man v. 
Lynchburg, 129 Va. 453. 
We like to think of the act as _being highly desirable legis-
lation, beneficial to the public in g·eneral, to the employee 
and his dependents and to the employer. However, none of 
these considerations will be served by amending or extending 
its provisions by construction-it is a contract between 
18* the employee, the employer, *and the insurance carrier. 
Whenever the need may require an amendment or ex-
tension of its provisions, as this court has said, tl1e legisla-
ture is the proper department of our government to make 
thP,m. 
In considering the 3rd assignment of error ("The Com-
mission erred in entering an award of compensation to claim-
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ant for a sum in excess of $657.54 payable as provided by 
law.") separately, we call the court's attention to the lan-
guage near the middle of said section 39, which is as fol-
lows: 
"If the employee leave dependents only partly dependent 
upon his earning·s for support at the time of the injury, the 
weekly compensation to be paid as aforesaid., shall equal the 
::,ame proportion of the weekly payments for the benefit of 
persons wholly dependent, as the extent of partial dependern;y 
bears to total dependency. * ~ e." 
We understand that provision of the act to mean that where 
the amount of compensation shall not in any case exceed 
$1,000.00, the amount payable to such dependent is the sum 
the per centum of dependency bears to amount limited for 
total dependency, namely, $1,000.00. That is to say, if the 
claimant herein is 48/73 per centum dependent as was de-
termined by the Commission, his gross compensation would 
be 48/73 of $1,000.00 or $657 .54, payable as the law directs. 
The fourt~ assignment of error is as follows: 
'' The Commission erred in refusing to limit the amount 
payable for burial expenses.'' 
The act in question, sec. 39., provides for payment of burial 
expenses not to exceed one hundred and fifty dollars. The 
Insurer was directed to have the body of decedent prepared, 
otc., and shipped to Mrs. Angelina Rogreguos in New York 
City, where it was understood the body would be buried. 
19* *The undertaker and railroad carrier demanded pay-
ment of the costs before this could be done. The charges 
exceeded $150.00, however, they were paid by the Insurer and 
tl1e body was prepared and shipped as directed. After the 
hotly arrived at New York City, it was later sent from there 
to Puerto Rico, and the charges incident thereto amounted 
to $130.00, which the evidence shows; has not been paid, and 
for which, of course, the Insurer is not liable. 
We assume the final award of the Commission has the force 
and effect of a judgment and unless the award limits the 
amount of the burial expenses to be paid as provided by law, a 
legal question may unnecessarily arise. Petitioners there.:. 
fore, at the hearing by the full Commission requested it to 
make its award on the point in question definite and certain 
which it failed to do. vVe respectfully submit that the award 
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should have limited the payment of the burial expenses to a 
sum not in excess of $150.00. 
For the reasons he).'einbefore assigned, we respectfully sub-
mit that the award of compensation entered by the Indus-
triaJ Commission of Virginia, in this case is contrary to the 
law in such cases made and provided. 
Your petitioners accordingly respectfully pray that an ap-
peal from the award of the Industrial Commission of Vir-
ginia, entered in the case aforesaid on the 7th day of June, 
. HJ44, may be allowed them; that a suversedeas be awarded; 
that the said award may be reviewed and reversed; that a 
final decree may be entered by this court limiting the amount 
of the award to the sum of $657.54 payable according to law, 
and that your petitioners may be granted all such other 
20* and further relief *as the nature of their case may re-
quire and to this court may seem meet. 
Petitioners adopt this petition as their opening brief and 
respectfully request that counsel may appear and state orally 
tb<' reasons for reviewing the award complained of. 
The petition will be filed in the office of the Clerk at Rich-
mond. 
We aver that on the 23 day of June, 1944, before filing, a 
copy of the petition was sent by registered mail to Mr. Albert 
,V. Richman, 11 Park Place, New York City, N. Y. Counsel 
of record for the claimant, appellee herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALPHONSE CUSTODIS CHIMNEY CON-
STRUCTION COMP ANY AND UNITED 
STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY 
COMPANY 
Bys. L. CREATH, 
GEORGE B. WHITE, 
S. L. CREATH, 
701-8 Law Building, 
Richmond, Virginia. 
GEORGE B. WHITE, 
501-6 Law Building, 
Richmond, Virginia., 
Counsel for Petitioners. 
Counsel for Petitioners. 
21 ':« *We, the undersigned counsel, practicing in the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that in 
,,-1 
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our opinion the award complained of in the foregoing peti-
tion is erroneous and should be reviewed and reversed by the 
Supreme Court of Appeals. of Virginia. · 
S. L. CREATH, 
GEORGE B. WHITE. 
Received June 23, 1944. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk . 
.Appeal allowed. Sitpersedas awarded. Bond $4,000.00. 
Aug. 7, 1944. 
JOHN W. EGGLESTON. 
Received August 8, 1944. 
M. B. W. 
RECORD 
Juan F. Cruz (Deceased), Employee, Juan Cruz Molina,. 
Claimant, 
v. 
Alphonse Custodis Chimney Const. Co., Employer, U. S. 
Fidelity & Guaranty Company, Insurer. 
Claim No. 633-043. 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty.,. 
Richmond, Virginia. 
Mr. Albert W. Richman, 
11 Park Place, 
New York, N. Y. 
Gentlemen: 
March 3, 1943. 
The above styled case is before me for proper consideration. 
In the first place, I see no necessity of setting this case for 
hearing in Hampton, Virginia, where the accident occurred, 
as I understand that the insurance carrier will admit tl1at the 
accident arose out of and in the. course of the employment. 
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I presume that the parties of interest can agree on an aver-
age weekly wage which appears to be $48.80. 
The third question that arises is that of dependency and 
the extent as well as the construction of our Section 
page 2 ~ 39, which is familiar to all parties. . 
I think that the best ,·vay is for you people to 
agree for the taking of depositions of such parties in Puerto 
Rico as you desire and for you to submit to me authorities 
as to the proper interpretation of our Section 39. I wish that 
you would get together and agree on the method of taking 
the depositions in Puerto Rico and do this as promptly as 
possible. 
In reply to question submitted by counsel for the claimants, 
I see no necessity for him to associate any counsel in Virgini3: 
in this matter. 
A prompt acknowledgment of this letter will be greatly ap-
preciated. 
Very truly yours, 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA, 
Chairman. 
PPD~GW 
page 3 ~ 
:Mr. Albert vV. Richman, 
Attorney at Law, 
11 Park Place, 
New York, N. Y. 
Re: Claim No. 633-043. 
March 19, 1943. 
John F. Cruz v. Alphonse Custodis Chimney Co . 
. 
Dear Sir: 
I represent the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Com-
pany, the insurance carrier in this case. . . 
I have been authorized by Mr. Creath to write you that Ins 
company will admit that John F. Cruz, deceased, died. from 
personal injuries by accident which arose out of and m the 
course of his employment; and that his average weekly wage 
was $48.80. 
We cannot agree on the other points or questions at issue. 
The company will have a representative attend the taking of 
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depositions in Puerto Rico ·at such time as the Commission 
may set. 
GBW/ld 
page 4 ~ 
I, 
Yours truly, 
(Signed) GEORGE B. WHITE. 
( Translation.) 
SWORN STATEMENT. 
JUAN CRUZ MOLINA, 
after being duly sworn depose and say: 
That my name is as above mentioned, am over 21 years old 
( 46 years), a widower, cobbler by trade and resident of Ward 
Sabana, in the municipality of Guayn.abo, Puerto Rico. 
That the name of my decedent wife was Dolores Maisonet 
whom I married in San Juan, Puerto R.ico in the year 1918 
and that two children were born to her, one named Juan Fran-
cisco and the other Carlos. 
That Juan Francisco left for the United States in the year 
1940 and while there used to write me weekly; that he worked 
in a toy factory, also joined the regular army of the United 
Statee having been discharged therefrom owing to physical 
reasons, that he also was employed on board a steamer plying 
between the United States and South America and that shortlv 
before his death he worked for the Alphonse Chimney Con-
struction Company for whom he had already worked down 
here in Puerto Rico at the time said Company had a contract 
for the construction of the smokestack of the cement factory 
in Catano. 
That he was acquainted with the death of his son Juan Fran-
cisco through a cablegram sent to him 11y the Company for 
whom his son was working; that alth.:mgh he cabled said Com-
pany expressing his wish that the body of his son be sent down 
to be buried in Puerto Rico, no reply was ever received; that 
subsequently he was informed through a cablegram 
page 5 ~ received from Mrs. Angelina Rodriguez that the body 
had been delivered to her but that she had no funds 
with which to pay the undertaker; that the undersigned au-
thorized by cable that the burial be made by Monje Funeral 
Parlors of New York; that the burial was taken care flf by 
said undertakers and that they have sent him a bill amount-
ing to $130.00 which is still outstanding. 
\ 
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Juan Cruz Molina. 
That decedent had no other heirs with the exception of 
the undersigned and decedent's brother, Carlos Cruz Maisonet, 
20 years old, electrician helper, who lives with the under--
signed. 
That although the undersigned has not remarried he has 
four other children named Socorro, 10 years old, Rafael, 6 
years old, Hector Man.uel, 5 years old and Manuel, 2 years 
old, born out of wed-lock. : 
That my son Juan Francisco always did provide me with 
funds out of his salary in approximately $12.00 a month. 
That Juan Francisco was single and that his only heirs 
are the undersigned as father and his brother Carlos. 
That the undersigned has taken certain steps in connec-
nection with this matter through the Puerto Rico Chapter 
of the .American Red Cross. 
That the foregoing· is a free and unsolicited statement of 
the above mentioned facts in connection with this matter. 
Signed at San Juan, Puerto Rico, the thirteenth day of 
.N'ovember, 1942. · 
(Signed) JU.AN CRUZ MOLINA. 
page 6 ~ Affidavit .N' o. 4089. 
Sworn and subscribed to before me by J nan Cruz Molina, 
of the age, trade and residence above described, to me per- · 
sonally known in San Juan, Puerto Rico, this thirteenth day 
of November, 1942. 
(Signed) GUILLERMO SILVA; 
Notary Public. 
page 7 } Deposition of witness 
JU.AN CRUZ MOLINA. 
In the City of San Juan, Puerto Rico, on this 26th day of 
},ebruary, 1944, pursuant to the request of Guillermo Silva, 
Esq., representing George B. White, Esq., attorney for the 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company in Richmond, 
N'irginia, insurers of Alphonse Custodis Chimney Construc-
tion Co., at my office located at No. 28 Brau St., in San Juan, 
Puerto Rico, duly appeared before me, Miguel Marcos Con-
treras, a Notary Public in and for the island of Puerto Rico, 
deponent Mr. Juan Cruz Molina, a witness in an action pend-
ing in the Industrial Commission of Virginia, relative to ·a 
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J itan Cruz lJl olina. 
.... ·· 
claim filed for compensation by the dependents of Juan Fran-
cisco Cruz, who died as a result of an accident which occurred 
on August 3rd, 1942, while he was working under the employ 
of Alphonse Custodis Chimney Construction Co. · 
Mr. Juan Cruz Molina, after being first duly sworn by me, 
was then and there· examined and interrogated by Guillermo 
Silva, Esq., on behalf of the United States Fidelity & Guar. 
anty Co. and was cross examined by Jose A. Varona Pacheco, 
Esq., as one of the attorneys for Juan Cruz Molina, in the c.ase 
pending before the Industrial Commission of Virginia, and 
the witness Juan Cruz Molina testified as follows: 
The Commissioner: (To Mr. Juan Cruz Molina, the ,vit-
ness) Will you please stand up¥ Do· you swear to tell the 
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you 
God¥ 
page 8 ~ Witness: Yes. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Silva: 
Q. Will you state your name, pleaseY 
A. Juan Cruz Molina. 
Q. How old are you? 
A. I am forty-seven years old. 
Q. Where do you live¥ 
A. I live in Nueva Caparra, Municipality of Guaynabo. 
Q. Is that place also known as Sabana ¥ 
A. Yes, the place is also known as Sabana. 
Q. How long have you been living there"? 
A. About eight or nine years, that is, since 1935 or 1936. 
Q. Is that the same residence and domicile which you had 
from August, 1941 to August, 19421 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you married or single? 
A. I am a widower of Dolores Maisonet. 
Q. ·when did she die T 
A. About fifteen years ago. 
Q. Have you been living alone since she died 1 
A. No. 
Q. Did you have any children out of your marriage with 
Mrs. Dolores Maisonet f 
A. Yes, I had two children. 
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Juan Cruz JJf.olina. 
page 9 ~ Q. State their names. 
A. Juan Francisco Cruz Maisonet and Charles 
Cruz Maisonet. 
· Q. Are they both living? 
A. No, Juan Francisco died on August 3, 1942. 
Q. Besides your two sons mentioned, who else lives with 
you? 
A. I have a common-law wife named Eliezef de Jesus and 
I have five children out of my relations with her. 
Q. Up to the death of Juan Francisco Cruz·on August 3r 
1942, how many members composed your family? 
.A. My family was composed of my common-law wife 
Eliezer, four children and my son Charles Cruz Maisonet. 
Q. Who owns the house where you are living now? 
A. I own the house at the present time. 
Q. Who was the former owner of the house? 
A. Juan Lopez Olivo. 
Q. When did you buy the house from him? 
A. Around November, 1943. 
Q. How much did you pay for the house 1 
A. I paid $60.00 for the house. 
~- How much rent did you pay for that house from 1941 
to 1942 per month Y 
A. The rent I paid was $7.00 per month and subsequently 
he reduced it to $5.00 per month. Specifically from 1941 tu 
1942 I paid $5.00 per month, but I was in arrears as 
page 10 ~ a rule. ' 
Q. Of what does the house consist of 7 
A. The house consists of two rooms and there is a kitchen 
and a latrine in the yard. 
Q. Do you owe any money f 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Before you bought that house did you pay your debts? 
A. No. 
Q. ·where is your son . Charles Cruz Maisonet now 1 
A. He is in the army now. 
Q. Since when is he in the army? 
A. Since December, 1943. 
Q. Do you know whether he was working as an electricia11 
with Antonio Torreche in 1941 and 1942 Y 
A. He was an apprentice. 
Q. How much did he earn as an apprentice with Mr. Tor-
recheY 
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Jitan Cruz Molina. 
A. He received an average of $3.00 per· week to cover ex-
penses. · 
Q. How long did that apprenticeship last! 
A. It was over a year. 
Q. Do you know whether Charles also worked at the Base ci 
A. He worked at Ensenada, Fajardo, for two months. 
Q. "\Vhen was that f 
A. That was in November, 1943. 
Q. Will you state how much did your son, Charles Cruz, 
contribute to the support of the family during 1941 and 19421 
A. At that time his only income was $3.00 per 
page 11 ~ week which he received from Mr. Antonio Tor-
reche, and he used it to cover expenses, and for 
said reason was not able to contribute to the support of the 
family. 
Q. Is your common-law wife engag·ed in any occupation? 
A. She does housewife work. 
Q. Are you sure that she is not doing some ·washing und 
· laundry work for people in the vicinity1 
A. No. 
Q. Then she brings absolutely nothing for the support of 
the children. 
A. No. 
Q. "What was your occupation during 1941 and 19421 
A. I was a shoe mender but out of work. 
Q. But you did not mend the shoes of your neighbors 'I 
A. No. . 
Q. When was the last time you worked as a shoe mender¥ 
A. By the last time I worked as a shoe mender was about 
ten years ago. 
Q. ·what was then your occupation during 1941 and 1942? 
A. I sold lottery tickets. 
Q. Do you remember what was your income out of t'lach 
drawing? . 
A. About four or five dollars out of each drawing. 
Q. And that is the only income you received during 1941 
and 1942? 
A. Yes, that's all. 
page 12 ~ Q. When did your son Juan Francisco Cruz leave 
for the United States Y 
A. About two months before the local elections, that is 
around September, 1940. 
Q. When Juan Francisco Cruz was in Puerto Rico, what was 
his occupation? 
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A. Before he left for the United States he worked at the 
Board of Elections. 
Q. What was his salary at the Board of Elections f 
A. More or less four dollars per day. 
Q. How long did he work at the Board of Elections 1 
A. About two months. · 
Q. Before he worked at the Board of Elections, what was 
his occupation? 
A. He also worked at the Puerto Rico Cement factory at 
Guaynabo. 
Q. How long did he work there¥ 
A. Over a year. 
Q. What was his salary when he was working for the Puerto 
Rico Cement factory? 
A. At :first he was paid 25 cents per hour, and later on his 
salary was raised to 40 cents per hour. 
Q. But what was his weekly salary? 
A. An average of $20.00 per week. 
Q. vVhy did he leave for the States if he had work here 
in Puerto Rico? 
page 13 ~ A. At the time he left for the States he was 
out of work. 
Q. Didn't you say that he was working at the Board of 
Elections? 
A. He was left out of work at the Board of Elections. 
Q. Will you state for what length of time he was out of 
a job before he left for the States? 
A. For about a month. 
Q. Who paid for his transportation to the States Y 
A. He paid for that. 
Q. Out of his savings f 
A. Yes: 
Q. Will you state how much did Juan F,rancisco Cruz con-
tribute for the support of your family before he left for the 
States? 
A. He contributed one-half of his salary. 
Q. Do you"'remember having worked in a billiard room of 
Juan Lopez Olivio in Nueva Caparra? 
A. I used to go to the billiard room of .Juan Lopez Olivo 
occasionally and I earned some money working as a sort of 
groupier. 
Q. That was before the death of your son? 
A. That was after my son's death. 
Q. Are you sure of that? 
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A. I am sure. 
Q. Isn't it a fact that the pool room was opened before the 
death of your son? 
.A. Yes, for about two months before the death of my son. 
Q. Do you have electric light at home Y 
page 14 ~ A. Yes: · 
Q. Since when¥ 
A. Since last year. 
Q. Then during 1941 and 1942 yon did not have electric 
light at home? 
A. No. 
Q. During- 1941 and 1942 did you have any current water 
from the water :works T 
A. No. 
Q. On the s~id period, did yon have fluid gas f 
A. No. 
Q. Where did you use to buy your groceries in 1941 and· 
1942 for the family? 
A. At the grocery store of Jose Lopez. 
Q. Did you have a charge account 1 
A. No. 
Q. Then you paid cash for everything¥ 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Did said grocery' store supply all your foodstuffs f 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was the average amount yon spent per week dur-
ing 1941 and 1942 at the grocery store! 
A. From twelve to fifteen dollars per week. 
Q. How did you manage to pay cash for that t 
A. Because I received money. 
Q. From whom? 
page 15 .~ A. From Juan Francisco Cruz. 
Q. When did you receive the first money order 
from Juan Francisco Cruz f 
A. About two weeks after he arrived at the States. 
Q. Do you know whether he was employed rigllt after his 
arrival f 
.A. The next day of his arrival he began to work. 
Q. Where? 
A. In a toy factory in New York City. . 
Q. Do you know what was his salary in the toy ractoryt 
.A. I don't know. 
Q. Do you remember the amount of his first remittance to 
youf 
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.A.. He sent me a money order for $15.00. 
Q. So that you state under oath that two weeks after he be-
gan to work he sent you a money order for $15.00¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. But you don't know his salary Y. 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And from there on how much did he send ou regularly 
every month f 
. A. He sent me an average of ten to twelve dollars per week 
at the beginning, but later on he increased his contribution 
to an average of twelve to fifteen dollars per week, up to 
the time of his death. 
Q. Was that money sent by money order or otherwise¥ 
A. In most cases he sent me the money in dollar bills. 
Q. Do you know whether it is permissible to send 
page 16 ~ dollar bills by mail Y 
A. I suppose that was for bidden by law and I 
told him so, but he stated that he had to work overtime and 
he didn't have spare time to get the money orders. 
Q. Do you know whether the post office in New York is 
open in nighttime? · 
A. No, I don't know that. 
Q. Do you know whether your son Juan Francisco Cruz 
was continuously working while he was in the States Y 
A. No. I think he was out of work for some time over 
a month. 
Q. Do you know why was it that he left New York City¥ 
A. I received a letter from him stating that he went to 
work in Virginia with the Alphonse Custodis Chimney Con-
struction Co. 
Q. See if this is your signature. 
A. Yes, that is my signature. 
Q. Do you remember having sworn to and subscribed a 
statement. before Guillermo Silva as a ·Notary Public on No-
vember 13, 1942, whose signature you have now admitted Y 
A. Yes, I remember having signed a document. 
Mr. Silva: To refresh the recollection of the witness, I am 
showing and handing to your attorney. Mr. Varona Pacheno, 
sworn statement as per affidavit No. 4089, dated November 13, 
1942, before Notary Public Guillermo Silva. 
page 17 ~ Q. This statement was sworn to and subscribed 
by you three months after the death of your son. 
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\Yere not the facts clearer in your mind at that time than one 
year and five months later? 
A. Certainly, yes, the facts were clearer in my mind ·three 
months after the death of my son than today. 
Q. That statement was subscribed by you voluntarily? 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Silva: I offer in evidence, to form part of the record 
of this deposition, sworn statement of deponent Juan Cruz 
Molina, dated November 13, 1942, as per affidavit No. 4089, 
sworn to and subscribed before Notary Public Guillermo 
Silva. 
Mr. Varona: I have no objection. 
The Commissioner: The document offered by Mr. Silva is 
duly admitted and identified by me and marked Exhibit A of 
the United States Fidelit & Guaranty Co. 
Q. What was the family relationship between the deceased 
Juan Francisco Cruz and your common-law wife? 
Q. "\Vhat was the family relationship between ,Tuan Fran-
Q. ·what was the famliy relatio·nship between Juan Fran-
cisco Cruz and the children which you have with- your com-
mon-law wife? 
A. Half brothers on the father's side. 
page 18 ~ Q. "'\Vhen Juan, Francisco Cruz was in the army 
in New York how much did he send you? 
A. He was in the army £or about a month and his salm·y 
was $21 per month. 
'Q. Did you receive anything from him while he was in the 
army? · · 
A. Nothing during the month that he was in the army . 
. Q. In spite of the fact that you claim your son sent you ltll 
average of $60 per month, you never moved to a bett~r house 
than the one you have been living? 
A. No. 
Q. Anc1 in spite of the fact tlrnt yon counted with $60 per 
month from your son and your income from the sale of the 
Jottery tickets, you continued living in a house paying five dol-
lars per month? 
A. Yes. 
Q. During all the time that Juan Francisco Cruz was in 
the States, could you testify how many months he failed to 
send you any money? 
. A. More or less two months. 
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Mr. Silva: That ·will be all for the direct examination. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Mr. Varona: 
Q. Do you remember when you first called on us in regard 
to this case? 
A. Immediately after my son's death. 
page 19 } Q. How much do you owe at the present time! 
Mr. Silva: I file my objection to that question because it 
is irrelevant and impertinent, as the pertinent fact refers 
to the dependency one year prior to the death of his son. 
A. In Joseph Lopez grocery I owe about $300.00. I owe also 
about $200.00 to ~y brother for expenses incurred by him in 
his trip to New York relative to this case. 
. Q. Why didn't you work as a shoe mender on or before 
1942? 
A. Because there was no business. 
Q. In the sworn statement before Notary Public, Mr. Silva, 
you stated that your son used to contribute with $12.00 monthly 
for the support of his family. Is that correct? 
A. That is not correct. He might have understood me to 
say monthly but I remember having stated it was weekly. 
Q. Answering to the direct examination you stated to Mr. 
Silva that the facts were more clear in your rninth three 
months after your son's death; but are they also clear nowt 
A. Sure. 
Mr. Varona: That's all with the cross examination. 
Having concluded the direct examination by Mr. Silva and 
the cross examination by Mr. Varona Pacheco, I, the Notary 
Public, Miguel Marcos Contreras, acting as Commissioner in 
this case, read and translated to the witness, Mr. 
page 20 ~ Juan Cruz Molina each and every one of the ques-
tions and amd answers since he stated that he 
did not understand the English language. After hearing all 
of the questions and answers above transcribed, the witness, 
Juan Cruz Molina, accepted and approved them as being 
exactly the questions put to him by Mr. Silva in his direct 
examination and Mr. Varona Pacheco in his cross exami-
nation, and his answers to said questions, and swears that he 
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has stated in his answers the truth, the whole truth and noth-
ing but the truth, and he proceeded afterwards to subscribe 
this deposition in my presence, in the City of San Juan, Puerto 
Rico, this 26th day of February, 1944. 
(Signed) JUAN CRUZ MOLINA, 
Witness. 
Before me 
.(Signed) MIGUEL MARCOS CONTRERAS, 
Notary Public. 
Affidavit No. 1463. 
CERTIFICATE. 
I, :Miguel Marcos Contreras, a Notary Public in and for 
the island of Puerto Rico, do hereby certify: that the above 
transcribed deposition was taken, sworn and subscribed be-
fore me by Mr. Juan Cruz Molina in my office at No. 28, 
Brau Street, San Juan, Puerto Rico, at 3 :00 P. M. of this 
26th day of February, 1944. 
(25c) 
(Stamp) 
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(Signed) MIGUEL MARCOS CONTRERAS, 
Notary Public. 
THE PEOPLE OF PUERTO RICO 
Office of The 
Executive Secretary. 
I, E. D. BROWN, Executive Secretary of Puerto Rico, 
DO HEREBY .CERTIFY: That Miguel Marcos Contreras, 
whose official attestation appears to the annexed instrument, 
was; on the day of the same, and is at present, a Notary Pub-
lic in and for the Island of Puerto Rico, his authority as 
such being filed and registered in this office; that he, as such 
Notary Public, is empowered to administer oaths, affidavits, or 
affirmations; to authorize affidavits or declarations of authen-
ticity; to take acknowledgments of deeds and other instru-
ments affecting land situate in the District of Columbia, or 
any other territory or possession of the United States; to 
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certify to, or to witness the truth or recognition of a signature, 
an oath, or any fact, act, or contract of a mere private nature 
affecting real or personal property; to certify contracts and 
other extrajudicial instruments that are executed in his pres-
ence; and to draft original deeds and to issue copies thereof; 
that to all his official acts as such Notary Public full faith 
and credit may and ought to be given in all Courts of Justice 
and elsewhere; and having compared the seal and signature 
of the said MIGUEL MARCOS CONTRERAS to said at-
testation with his signature and seal registered in this office 
pursuant to law, I verily believe same to be genuine. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand 
and affixed the Great Seal of Puerto Rico, at the City of San 
Juan, this 28th day of February, in the year of our 
page 22 } Lord one thousand nine hundred and forty-four. 
(Seal) 
( $1.00 Stamp.) 
(Signed) E. D. BROWN, 
Executive Secretary of Puerto Rico. 
(Exhibit "A "-Sworn Statement of Juan Cruz Molina, is 
contained on· Pages 4 and 5 of this record.) 
page 23 } DEPOSITION TAKEN TO THE DEPONENT 
MR JUAN CRUZ MOLINA. · 
At San Juan, Puerto Rico, on the 12th day of .A.ngust, 1943, 
. BEFORE ME 
Jose A. ,Varona Pacheco, Attorney at Law and Notary Public 
of Puerto Rico with legal office in the Bouret Building, San 
Juan, Puerto Rico, duly authorized to take this deposition to 
Mr. Juan Cruz Molina, questioned by l\f.r. Augustin Perez 
Rodriguez, Esquire, representing Mr. A. "\V. H. Richman, Es-
qnire, Counsellor at Law nf the City of Nm\1 York, who at the 
same time represents in the state of Virginia, the af ore~ai cl 
Juan Cruz Molina in a case pending before the Industrial' Com .. 
mission of Virginia, U. S. A. In accordance to the instruc-
tions received by this office from Mr. Albert W. Richman, 
Messrs. F. Carrera & Hno., whose address is at Mayaguez, 
Puerto Rico, and who were going- to represent the Insurance 
Carrier, were duly notified reg·arding the date time and placP, 
where and when the testimony was to be taken as it appears 
from the accompanied letters and documents, and since they 
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. ,.. ": 
I 
did not show up as requested, I proceeded to take this depo-
sition to Mr. Juan Cruz Molina in my office, this 12th day 
of August, 1943, at San Juan, Puerto Rico and in my presence, 
Mr. Agustin Perez, Esquire, proceeded to examine the wit-
ness, Mr. Juan Cruz Molina, who after having been duly 
sworn, answered to the interrogatory in the following way: 
Q. ,vhat is your name? 
A. Juan Cruz Molina. 
Q. ·where do you live f 
A. I live at Nueva Caparra, Municipal jurisdiction of Guay-
nabo, territory of Puerto Rico, United States of America. 
Q. How old are you f 
page 24 ~ A. I am 47 years old. 
Q. What is your occupation f 
A. I have no occupation at present. 
Q. A re you a citizen of the United States of America? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When and where were you born? 
A. I was born in the year 1896, at Manati, Puerto Rico. 
Q. Do you know Juan Francisco Cruz? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ·what relationship existed between Juan F. Cruz and 
yourseln 
A. J ,vas his father. 
Q. Is he alive? 
A. No, he is dead. 
Q. ·when did he die? 
A. He died on August 3, 1943. 
Q. "Where did he die? 
A. He died in the state of Virginia, United States of 
America while working with the Alphons Chimney Construc-
tion Co. 
Q. By the time he snfferen the accident that caused his 
death, were you a resident of Puerto Rico? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you ever been absent from Puerto Rico? 
A. Yes, in the year 1918. Q. vVhere did you go? 
A.. I went to South Carolina in a labor expedition. 
Q. When did you return? 
page 25 r A. I returned the same year, a week or two after 
the armistice was signed. 
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Q. Si11ce that day, have you ever·been residing in the Island 
of Puerto Rico 1 
.A.. Ye~> s1r. 
Q. Do you lilean to say, that you have never been absent 
from Puerto Rico a sing·le day since 1918 t 
A. Exactly, I have never been absent. 
Q. When did your son go to the United States t 
A. Before our local elections, that is two ur three months 
before November, 1940. 
Q. vVhy did your son go to the United States? 
A. Because things were going too bad for us in Puerto 
Rico. Neither he nor I were wprking. 
Q. How long after he arrived in the States was he unem-
ployed? 
A. Not too long before almost immediately he began to send 
me money. 
Q. Since 1941 up to the time he died, how much money did 
you re.ceive from him sporadically! 
A. I received from him thirty dollars from. him every two 
weeks, when he was working. 
Q. In what form did you receive the moneyi 
A. Almost in every occasion he sent me enclosed cash. SomE-
time three ten dollar bills; others a twenty dollar bill and a 
ten dollar bill. Once or twice he sent me money orders. I. 
think he had no spare time because he worked extra hours. 
Q. Did he at any time send you less than thirty 
page 26 } dollars ? 
A. Yes. once or twice he sent me less than that 
amount. 
Q. Did at any time he send you more than that amounU 
A. Ye~ on several occasions he sent me forty five dollars 
every two weP.ks. 
Q. Did at any time he did not send you regularly every two 
weeks the ref erred amount¥ 0 
A. Yes when he was n<;>t working. 
Q. How long he did not work in the year 19421 
A. I remember that he did not w-0rk only two months, but 
when he began to work he sent me twice as much as he did 
when he was working so as to compensate for the time he did 
not send me money. 
Q. A~cording to your estimate with what average per weeJr 
did he contribute for your support during the year im-
mediately previous to the time that he died? 
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A. With an average varing from thirteen to fifteen dollar~ 
· per week. 
Q. Row can you determine that! 
A. vV ell, I was not working and I had to pay the accounts 
of the grocery store, drug store, etc. 
Q. What average did you spend in drug store and grocery 
stores per w:eekY 
A. Fourteen to eighteen dollars per week. 
Q. Of how many members is your family composed t 
A. Of eight members. My wife and I and six children. 
Q. vVhich are the respective ages of those children. 
A. The youngest is six months, others a.re two, 
page 27 ~ four, seven, ten, and eighteen years respectively. 
Q. Is your family solely or partially dependent 
apon you! 
A. Tl,ey depend solely upon me. . 
Q. When your son died, did you .have 811Y dehtsf 
A. Yes, l owed eight dollars at ihe grocery store and five 
dollars at the drug siore. 
Q. Do yon have any debts nowY 
A. Yes, I owe at the grocery store and to several friends 
about three hundred fifty dollars, and I al~o owe one hundred 
dollars to a brother. 
Q. Why are you so much indebtedi 
A.. Well. because T have nobody to help· me 11.ow, and I have 
a big family to su-pport. 
Q. Since th'1 time that your son diAd h8ve you HfT~r been 
emnlovedV 
A. In a permanent employment, no ThP ()nly worJr ~hat I 
lrn.ve been occasionally doing since 1941. 1 q selling 7 1ttery 
tickets of Puerto Ri M. 
0. How much do you _get from each drstwingf 
A. An average of about eight dollars 
0. How frequently can you depend on the-.;e drawing~ 
A. Every ten da.v~. 
0. Can you live and support yor.r family with sucl 
amounts! 
A. Certainly not. Don't you see how much I am indebtedf 
Q. Were you totally or partially dependent to your son Y 
A. Almost totally. I should say that I depended on him 
for almost eighty five per cent. 
nage 28 ~ Having concluded the above transcribed inter· 
rogatory the Notary Public Mr. Jose A. Varona 
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Pacheco read and translated to the witness Mr. J uian Cruz 
Molina each and every one of the questions and answers since 
he stated that he did not understand the English language. 
After hearing all of it the witness approved all of it and swore 
that what he had stated in his answers is the truth the whole 
truth and nothing but the truth, and proceeded afterwards 
to sign it at the city of San Juan, Island of Puerto Rico, United 
States of America, this 12th of August, 1943. 
Before me 





I, Jose A. Varona Pacheco, Notary Public in and for the 
Island of Puerto Rico, United States of America, do hereby 
certify, that the above transcribed deposition was taken, sworn 
and subscribed before me to Mr. Juan Cruz Molina at my 
office, Bouret Building, San Juan, Puerto Rico, U. S. A., at 
11 A. M:. of the 12th da): of August, 1943. 
(Signed) JOSE A. VARONA PACHECO, 
Notary Public. 
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Office of the 
Executive Secretary. 
I, E. D. Brown., Executive Secretary of Puerto Rico DO 
HEREBY CERTIFY: That Jose A. Varona Pacheco, whose 
official attestation appears to the annexed instrument. was, 
on the day of the same, and is at present, a Notary Public 
in and for the Island of Puerto Rico, his authority as such 
being filed and registered in this office; that he, as such Notary 
Public, is empowered to administer oaths, affidavits, or affir-
mations; to authorize affidavits or declarations of authen-
ticity; to take acknowledgments of deeds and other instn1ment~ 
affecting land situate in the District of Columbia, or any other 
territory or possession of the United States; to certify to, 
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or to witness the truth or recognition of a signature, an oath, 
or any fact, act, or contract of a mere private nature affect-
ing real or personal property; to certify contracts and other 
extrajudicial instruments that· are executed in his presence; 
and to draft original deeds and to issue copies thereof; that 
to all his official acts as such Notary Public full faith and 
credit may and ought to be given in all Courts of Justice and . 
elsewhere; and having compared the seal and signature of the 
said Jose A. Varona Pacheco to said attestation with his 
signature and seal reg·istered in this office pursuant to law, 
I verily believe same to be genuine. 
IN "WITNESS ,vHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand 
and affixed the Great Seal of Puerto Rico, at the 
page 30 ~ City of San Juan, this thirteen day of August, in 




(Signed) E. D. BROWN, 
Executive Secretary of Puerto Rico. 
page 31 ~ Juan F. Cruz (Deceased), Employee; Juan Cruz 
Molina, Claimant, 
v. 
Alphonse Custoclis Chimney Const. Co., Employer; U. S. 
~·idelity & Guaranty Company, Insurer. 
Claim No. 633-043. 
May 11, 1944. 
Albert W. Richman, Attorney-at-Law, 11 Park Place, New 
York City, for the Claimant. 
George B. White, Attorney-at-Law, Law Building, Rich-
mond, Virginia, for the Insurance Carrier. 
Deans, Commissioner, rendered the opinion. 
By agreement of all pa'rties of interest, the claim for com-
pensation due to the accident of Juan F. Cruz was filed upon 
statements made and depositions taken on behalf of all the 
parties of interest. 
It was agreed by the representative of the employer that 
the accident arose out of and in the course of the employ-
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ment on August 3rd, 1942, which caused death, with the Al-
phonse Custodis Chimney Construction Company, and that 
the average weekly wage was $48.80. 
The two questions involved in this case are whether the de-
pendents of the deceased employee were under Section 39 of 
the "\Vor1.'1llen 's Compensation Act as to allowing restricted 
benefits, or the maximum benefits allowed to partial de-
pendents under the VVorkmen 's Compensation Act of Virginia. 
It is determined by the Hearing Commissioner that 
page 32 ~ the ,employee as well as the father, who was a de-
pendent, were residents of Puerto Rico and that 
Puerto Rico is a territory of the United States and is entitled 
to such benefits as any citizen of the United States is con-
cerned. 
This is a case which involves the interpretations of Section 
39 of the ,Vorkmen 's Compensation Law of Virgima of June 
26, 1942, which states as follows: 
"If the employee does not leave dependent citizens of, and 
residing at the time of the accident in the United States or 
Dominion of Canada, the amount of the compensation shall 
not in any case exceed $1,000.00. '' 
The question at issue is whether Puerto Rico, where thb 
dependent has been living since 1919 is United States within 
the meaning of the transcribed Section 39. In order to under-
stand the claimant's contention, that Puerto Rico is included 
within the term United States in accordance to the said Law 
of June 26, 1942, it is well to trace briefly the historical back-
ground of Puerto Rico under American Sovereignty from the 
Public International Law Point of :View. 
At the encl of the Spanish-American War, to be more pre-
cise, on the 12th of August, 1898, the Preliminary Peach Pro-
tocol between Spain and the United States was signed and 
the promise made by Spain to cede Puerto Rico thereby be-
came American territory by Article 9 of the Treaty. 
'' The civil rights and political status of the natives inhabi-
tants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States 
shall be determined by Congress.'' 
Furthermore Article 2 of the Treaty of Paris reads as fol-
lows: 
'' Spain cedes to the United States the island of Puerto Rico 
\ 
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and other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the 
page 33 ~ West Indies, and the islands of Guan and the 
:Marinos or Ladrones." (Ref. U.S. Statutes at L., 
Vol. 30, Page 1759.) 
Conclusion: 
In accordance to the aforesaid Treaty, we have a territory 
acquired ·by the United States that ceased to be Spanish, there-
by ceasing to be foreign in regard to the nation under whose 
sovereignty and domain Puerto Rico has been since 1898. 
Furthermore, it does not matter how logical this conclusion 
might appear, perhaps it might not be so convincing. Fortu-
nately for the claimant, the Supreme Court of the United 
States had its chance to pass over this issue in the far old days 
of the year 1900; in the leading case of the De Lima,. v·. Bidwe~l> 
182 U.S. 1, from where we quote: 
"With the ratification of the Treaty of Peace between the 
United States alfl,d Spain April 11, 1899, the isla'l'lid of P'lt,erto 
Rico ceased to be a foreign coui'l,t-ry." 
Even in the dissenting opinion of De Lima Case ''Supra'~ 
it is stated that the question at issue of that case does not 
consist in determining in general terms whether Puerto Rico 
is or not a fo1·eign country. This is admitted beyond an.if 
reasonable doitbt, that Puerto Rico frorn, the Public Inter-
nc#;ional Law Point of View is imqi,estionably a do1nestic 
ter1·itory of the United States. 
Paragraph 738-Page 237, 48 U. S. C. A. Note 5-Porto 
Rico and the United States were foreign countries with re-
spect to each other, within the meaning of reven1le laws, while 
the island was in the rnilitary occupation of the United States, 
before its cession to the United Btates by Treaty. Dooley v. 
U. 8. (N. Y., 1901), 215 ct. 762, 766, 182 U. S. 222, 
page 34 r 45 L. Ed. 1074-Armstrong v. U. 8. (Ct 190), 215 
ct. 827, 182 U.S. 243-45 L. Ed. 1086. 
The exaction duties on importations into Puerto Rico from 
the United States, before the cession of the island by treaty,. 
was properly made under the war power by General Miles' 
order of July 26, 1898, which merely extends the existing regu-
lations, and by the tariffs of August 19, 1898, and February 
1, 1898, prescribed by the president as Commander in Chief. 
Id. . 
Goods imported into Puerto Rico from the United States. 
after the cession of that island to the United States by the 
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Treaty of Peace with Spain held not subject to duties imposed 
by order of the military commander and by the President 
of the United States, as commander in chief, though the right 
to administer the government of the islancl continue in the 
1military commander since his power to levy d'ltties extended 
only to importations from foreign coitntries, and by the treaty 
of cession the island. ceased to be foreign cou,ntry, and the 
entry of goods from the ports of the United States was free 
until Congress should constitutionally legislate upon the sub-
ject. Id. 
Notes of Decisions, 48 U. S. C . .A., Parag·raph 732, page 
229. 
Note 1. 
Cession :-The relinquishment of sovereignty over any of 
the cession of claim by Spain to the United States of the 
island of Puerto Rico by the T1·eaty of Paris of 
page 35 ~ April 11, 1899 (30 Status 1754), must be regarded 
as immediate and absolute from the date of its sig-
nature, subject only to the possibility of a failure of ratifi-
cation 1901-23 Op. Atl. Gen. 553. 
Porto Rico did not become part of the United States until 
the Treaty had been signed by both the parties thereto and 
the ratifications of the same had been exchanged. A. 8. Las-
celles d'; Co. v. U. 8. (1914), 49 Ct. CL 382 affirmed, (1917) 37 
S. Ct. 400, 243 U. S. 625, 61 L. Ed. 935. 
Notes of Decisions, 48 U. S. C. A., Paragraph 734, Page 231. 
By the ratification of the treaty of peace by which Porto 
Rico was ceded to the United Staes, Porto Rico ceased to be 
subject of Spavn, and became subject to the legislative power 
of Congress but the civil government of the United State~ · 
could extend immediately and of its own force over conquered. 
and ceded territory though theoretically congress mig-ht enact 
a scheme of civil government to take effect immediately on the 
cession. Santia,qo v. Nogniters Porto Rico, 1909-29 S. Ct. 608-
214 U. S. 260-53 L. Ed. 989. 
U. S. C. A. Vol. 48, Paragraph 7 44, Page 242. 
2. Coasting Trade :-"By this Act it was evidently in-
tended, not only to nationalize all Porto Rico vessels of the 
United States, and admit them to be the benefits of their coast-
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ing trade, but to place Porto Rico substantially u.pon the cost 
of the United States, and vessels engaged in trade between 
. that island and the continent, as engaged in the coasting trade. 
* * * That the words 'coasting trade' are not intended to be 
strictly limited to trade between ports in adjoining 
page 36 ~ districts as is also evident from R. S. Section 4358. '' 
(Section 306 of Title 46, Shipping.) Hu.us v. New 
York, etc., Stemnship Co. (N. Y., 1901), 182 U.S. 392, 21 S. Ct. 
827, 45 L: Ed. 1146. 
This section extends and makes applicable the privileges 
and restrictions of the coasting trade of the United States 
not only to trade, but also to navig·ation between the ports of 
Puerto Rico and those of the United States; the words "coast-
ing trade" having· been used and construed as extending to 
the navigation by means of which such trade was carried on 
in the .Alaskan Act of 1868. Bigley v. New York & P. R. 8. 8. 
Go. (D. C. N. Y. 1900) 105 F. 74. 
Puerto Rico's first Organic Act under American Sover-
eignty was the li1oraker Act approved by the Congress of the 
United States on April 12., 1900. It states as follows in Sec-
tion First. 
"Be it enacted by the Senate of the House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congres·s assembled; 
that the provisions of this action shall apply to the island of 
Puerto Rico and to the adjacent islands belonging to the 
United States and waters of these islands; and the name of 
Puerto Rico as used in this act shall be held to include not 
only the island of that name but all the adjacent islands as 
hereinafter said.'' 
The Foraker Act changed the Military Regime established 
by the United States in Puerto Rico after the Spanish Ameri-
can "\Var for a Civil Regime. By virtue of this act 
page 37 ~ Puerto Rico was invested with a more or less 
autonomous organization. 
"Note 4-Thc purpose of the Foraker Act (April 12, 
1900--c 191-cited to the text and the Jones Act (March 2, 
1917 c 145 cited to the text) was to confer sovereignty on 
Porto Rico and an automonv similar to that of the states. 
Porto Rico ·Tax Appeals C. A. A. Porto Rico 1927) 16 Fed. 
(2d. 545) reversed on other grounds 1927 48 S. ct. 23-72 L. 
Ed. 
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U.S. C. A., Vol. 48, Paragraph 741, Page 241, Note. 2. 
Taxation-In Gro1nrner v. Standa'l·cl Dredging (Porto Rico, 
1912) 224 U.S. 362-32 S. Ct. 499-56 L. Eel 801, it was held that 
Porto Rico had power to tax certain machinery and boats 
which at the time of the levy of the taxes were in the harbor 
of San Juan, engaged in dredging work. The Court said: 
"vVe have seen that by paragraph 1 of the Foraker A.ct 
(historical note to section 731 of this title) all of its provi-
sions are made applicable to certain defined area and that the 
N anie Porto Rico "shall be held to inclitde 'liot only the island 
of that nanie but all adjacent islands and waters of the 
islands.'' The governmental powers conferred upon Porto 
Rico must be coextensive with that area, subject to the reser-
vation that all laws passed shall not be in conflict with the laws 
of the United States, and the power of enacting such laws is 
conferred upon the legislative assembly. There is precaution 
against abuse. They must be reported to Congress, which 
has the power to annul them. The purpose of the 
page 38 ~ act is to be given local self-governrnent, conferring 
an a/u.tonomy siniilar to that of the states and ter-
ritories, reserving to the United States rights to the harbor 
areas and navigable waters for the purpose of exercising the 
usual navigation control and jurisdiction over commerce and 
navigation. '' 
By the :B-,oraker Act, Puerto Ricans were permitted to elect 
by popular vote one of the two Chambers ereated by the Law 
which composed the Insular Legislature. (Foraker Act Sec. 
27.) The other Chamber was called Executive. Council. In 
this other Chamber its members were appointed by the Presi-
dent of the United States (Foraker A.ct. Sec. 18). The Execu-
tive Power was absolutelv in the hands of the Governor of 
the Island, (Foraker Act ·sec. 17) who was appointed by the 
Federal Authoritv. Section 31 of the Foraker Act stated 
that all laws, statutes or acts approved by the Legislative As-
sembly of Puerto R.ico must be submitted to the Congress of 
the United States of America who had the reserved faculty 
to annul if Congress considered it proper to do so. With this 
reserve of the Supreme Authority in the Congress of the 
United State~ it was disposed that the Legislative Assembly 
of Puerto Rico could exercise all tl1e Legislative Powers in 
relation tc local affairs. (Section 27.) Besides, the Foraker 
Act also provided in Section 7, 
"that all inl~abitants continuing to reside in Puerto Rico who 
.were Spanish subjects on the 11th of April 1898, and that re-
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sided in Puerto Rico, and their children born subsequently 
to, shaH be deemed and held to be citizens of Puerto Rico, 
and as such entitled to the protection of the United 
page 39 ~ States 9 • ~ and that together with such citizens 
of the United States as may reside in Puerto Rico 
shall constitute a body politic under the name of the People 
of Puerto Rico · with governmental powers as herein after 
conferred and with power to sue and to be sued as such." 
CONCLUSION:. 
With the above transcribed Sections within., we have proved 
that Puerto Rico although a territory, is included from the 
Public International Law Point of View· within the bigger 
term United States and that Puerto Rico enjoyed a more or 
less autonomous form of government. . 
.Almost immediately after the approval of the Foraker Act 
the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Downes 
v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 247, confronted itself with this same is-
sue but not from the Public International Law Point of View. 
Although in this case it was stated that from the Constitu-
tional Point of View, Puerto Rico is a territory which belongs 
to the United States, but that does not form part of the United 
States, yet it is astounding what is stated on page 262, Para-
graph 1, from where we quote: 
'' This case may be considered as establishing the principle 
that in dealing with foreign sovereignties, (that is from the 
Public International Law Point of View.): what is stated in 
parenthesis is ours; the term United States has a broader 
meaning than when used in the Constitution and includes all 
territories subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Govern-
ment hereafter located. In the treaties and conventions with 
foreign nations this Government is a unit. This is 
page 40 ~ to because the Federal Government is the only au-
thorized organ of the territory as well as of the 
states in their foreign relations.'' 
I D. Geofrey v. Rig,qs, 133 U. S. 258. 
Dissenting· opinion of Judge Harland in the Downes case 
(8u.pra) in which it is sustained that if Puerto Rico did not 
enter to form part of the United States of America imme-
diately after the Treaty of Peace with Spain was signed, there 
is no doubt at all that it was incorporated into the United 
States after there was implanted in the island a Civil Govern-
Alphonse Custodis Chimney Co., etc., v. J.C. Molina 41 
ment which constituted its inhabitants into a political body, 
which gave them a Governor and the right to appeal before 
the Suilreme Court of the United States; besides after the 
island was organized in such a form, it became an integral 
part of the U~ited States of America. 
~8 U. S. C. A.., Page 231, Paragraph 734; 
Porto Rico being an organized territory of United States 
and the laws of the United States not locally applicable 
havfog been extended to that island, its residents are entitled. 
to reg·ister trade marks in the United States as provided in 
.A.ct. March 3, 1881, 21 Status 502 (1902) 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 
634. '' 
In the Gonzales v. Williarns Case (48 U. S. Lawyers Ed. 
317) 192 U. S. 1) (48 U.S. C . .A., page 250, Note 3) The Su-
preme Court of the United States confronted itself with a 
very peculiar situation; a native of Puerto Rico who was an 
inhabitant of the Island at the time of the cession of the 
United States, was not a11owed by the Immigration Authori-
ties to enter the territory of the United States 
page 41 ~ upon the grounds that she was an alien immigrant. 
The Supreme Court of the United States decided: 
''that by the Treaty of April 11, 1898., 30 Status at L. 1754 
with Spain, natives of Puerto Rico are not alien immigranfa; 
within the meaning of the Act of Congress )farch 3, 1891, 26 
Statutes at L. 1084, 55 U. S. Com. Statutes of 1901, Page 1294-
1296, providing for the detention and deportation of A.lien 
Immigrants likely to become public charges.'' _ 
Furthermore, the Court said : 
'' The cession of Puerto Rico definitely transferred t1ie al-
legiance of the native inhabitants from Spain to the United 
States. The cession of the territory, its beconiing dornestic 
territorJ/ with the transfer of the allegiance of the inhabitants, 
naturalized the natives in the sense that they became passive 
citizens of the United States and entitled to all the rights, 
privileges and immunities of such." 
"In Article 2 of the Treaty of Paris it is stated that Spain 
cedes to the United States the island of Puerto Rico and other 
i_slands now under Spanish sovereignty in the vVest Indies.'' 
"In the Act to regulate the immigration of aliens into the 
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United States of March 3, 1903, 32 Statutes at L. 1203, Chapter 
1912, U. S. Compilation Statutes Supp. 1903, page 170. The 
latter Act was approved after Gonzales litigation was moved. 
It is worthy to note that the words United States used in. the 
title and throu.ghoiit the .Ast were requfrecl to be construed to 
mewn the United States ancl any waters, territories 
page 42 ~ or other place 1io1v su,bject to the jitriscliction 
thereof. The definition indicated the view of Con-
gTess on the general subject, Gonzales was not a passenger 
from foreign port and was a passenger from territory or 
other ,places subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." 
Paragraph 734-48 U. S. C. A., page 231. 
A Porto Rican engaged in the occupation of a seaman in the 
American Merchant :Marine, inclitding that of Porto Rico is 
nn .American seam.an within the moaning of the statutes re-
lating to relief by Consuls. (1901) 23 Op. Att. Gen. 400 Af-
firmed (1901) 23 Op. Gen. 414. 
Bidwell v. Levy Blumstiel (147, Federal 225) 48 U.S. C; A .. , 
page 237, Paragraph 738, No. 3. It was held by the Federal 
Courts that prod'ltcts froni Puerto Rico at the time of ini-
portation were not siib.iect to the tariff La.ivs because were 
not iniportecl from. a foreign country. 
CITIZENSHIP OF 1917. 
For approximately 17 years Puerto Rico was governed by 
the Foraker Act. ' On March 22, 1917 the Congress of the 
United States approved the new Organic Act for the island. 
This new Act is known as the ''Jones Act.'' In general terms 
our present government is as follows: We have a Legisla-
tive Assembly which consists of Two Houses, Senate and the 
House of Representatives. (Sections 25 and 26). The mem-
bers of both Houses are elected by popular vote and the Insu-
lar Legislature has power to enac.t laws in relation to local 
affairs. (Section 37.) The Executive Power resides in the 
Governor of the Island appointed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . by the 
President of the United States with the advice and 
page 43 ~ consent of the Senate of the United States, Sec-· 
tion 12, Organic Act. The Judicial Power resides 
in the Courts alreadv created in accordance with the Foraker 
Act but the Legislative Assembly has power in accordance to 
its judgment to or~:anize, modify or create new courts of jus-
tice and its jurisdiction and venue, except for the Coitrt of 
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the District Court of the United States. The judges of the 
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico are appointed by the President 
with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States 
( Section 40) as well as the judge and the prosecuting attor-
11ey for the District Cou:rt of the United States. The District 
Court of the United States has substantially the :same juris-
diction and venue of the District Court of the United States 
of America in all cases exceeding the amount of $3.,000.00 
wherever there is diversity of citizenship. "\Ve have the right 
to appeal to the Circuit Court of Boston from either the Su-
preme Court of Puerto Rico or the District Court of the 
United States for Puerto Rico in cases involving Constitu-
tional matters and cases involving an amount exceeding 
$3,000.00. We have right to appeal by certiorari to the Su-
preme Court of the United States in order to revise decisions 
of the Circuit Court of Boston. As it can already be seen 
with the approval of the New Organic Act for the island, 
Puerto Rico enjoy a better inter·vention and have a greater 
authority in relation to local affairs, and that we have an 
organization similar to that of manv states of the Union. But 
th~ most important Section of the Jones Act is the Section 5 
which reads as follows: 
"To all citizens of Puerto Rico * * "" aruJ, all ncdives of 
Puerto Rico who were temporarily absent f roni the islamd, 
April 11, 1898, and have since mid are pernwnently residing 
in this island and are not citizens of any foreign 
page 44 ~ country are hereby declared a.nd shall be deemed 
ancl held to be citizens of the United States." 
The leading case of Piterto Rico v. Shell, 302 U. S. decided 
recently, (1937) seems to sustain it absolutely. ·we tran .. 
scribed almost literally ( ad epedem literae) • • 19 • 
Puerto Rico v. Shell, 302 U. S. 253, Syllabus. 
The word territory in Paragraph 3 of the Sherman Anti-
tru.st .Act-forbidding contracts, combinations or Conspiracies 
in restraint of the trade or commerce i1i any territory of the 
United States, etc, was used in its 1nost comprehensive sense, 
as e11ibracin,q all organized territories, whether incorporated 
into the United States or not, and includes Puerto Rico. Page 
259. Mr. Justice Suther land delivered opinion of the Court. 
Sherman Act-Sec. 3. Every contract, combination in form 
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce in any territory of the United States or the Dis-
trict of Colitmbia is hereby declared illegal. The Court said: 
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First: Section 3 of the Sherman Act extends to '' any terri-
tory of the United States." But it is urged that Puerto Rico 
cannot be brought within the intent of this phrase, and there-
fore the section does not apply to that dependency. The 
point is well made. When the Sherman .Act was passed (1890) 
we had no insular dependencies., and necessarily, the applica-
tion of paragraph 3 did not extend beyond our continental 
domain, and undoubtedly, it was this domain which was the 
immediate contemplation of Cong-ress. Certainly, Congress 
at that tinie did not have Puerto Rico · in mind. 
page 45 ~ But that is not enough. It is necessary to go far-
ther and to say that if the acquisition of that 
insular dependency had been foreseen, Congress would have 
so varied its comprehensive language as to exclude it from 
the operation of the Act. Darnioi1,th Oolle,ge v. H' sochard 
(4 Wheaton 518) 644; Takao Ozawa v. U. 8., 260 U. S. 178,. 
195-196; U. 8. v. Third, 261 U.S. 204-207-209. The only ques-
tion therefore is whether the word ''territory" as used in 
paragraph 3 of the Sherman Act, properly can be applied to 
a dependency now bearing no relation to the United States 
which is borne by Puerto Rico * * * It is evident from a con-
sideration of the pertinent acts of Congress as a decision of 
the Court with resoect to these acts that whether Puerto Rico 
comes within· a given Congressional Act applicable in terms 
to a territory depends upon the character and· aim of the Act. 
Vi7ords have different shades of meaning and are to be con-
strued if reasonably possible to effectuate the intent of the 
lawmakers and the meaning in particular instance is to be 
arrived at not only by a consideration of the words them-
selves, but by considering as well, the context., the purpose of 
the law and the circumstances under which the words were 
employed. Atlantic Cleaners&; Dyers v. U. 8., 286 U. S. 427-
- 433; H elvering v. Stockhols (293 U. S. 84-86-87-88.) Thus 
although Porto Rico is not a territory within the reach of the 
sixth and seventh amendments and may not be a territory 
within the meaning of the words as used in some statutes, we 
held in Kopel v. ·Bin,qham~ 211 U. S. 468-474-476, that 
Puerto Rico WAS a territory within the meaning of para-
graph 5278 of the revised statittes which provides for the de-
mand and surrender of fugitives crim,inals by ,qovernor of ter-
ritories as weU as of states. The Court said that it was im-
pos·sible to hold that Puerto Rico was not intended 
page 46 ~ to have power ~o reclaim fugitives from its justice, 
, or that it was intended that it should be an asylum 
from fugitives of the United States. The word "tcrrit~ry'" 
as used in that statute was defined as meaning a portion of the 
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country not included within the limits of any state, and not 
yet admitted as a state into the Union but organized under 
the laws of Congress with a separate legislature under a ter-
ritorial governor and other officers appointed by the Presi-
dent and Senate of the United States,'' and the Court con-
cluded: "It may be justly asserted that Puerto Rico is a 
completely organized territory, although not a territory in-
corporated into the United States., and there is no reason why 
Puerto Rico should not be held to be such a territory as it is 
comprised in Paragraph 5278. '' See Porto Rico v. Roaslv 
and Castillo, 227 U. S. 270-274. Compare Talbott v. Silver 
Bow Coitrty, 139 U. S. 438-444-445. 
1'Vith equal force, -it may be said here that thereis no reason 
why Puerto Rico shoulcl not hold to a "territory" within the 
meaning of Paragraph 3 of the Shenn(l!YI, Act. It is pointed 
out in the Atlantic Cleaners v. Dyers case (supra) p. 435, 
that in the light of the applicable history and circumstances, 
it was apparent that Congress me~mt to deal comprehensively 
with the subject of the contracts, combination and conspiracies 
in restraint of trade, "and to that end to exercise all the 
power it possessed, ·that while Congress in passing Para-
graph 1 exercised only the power conferred by the commerce 
clause in passing paragraph 3 it exercised a general power, 
unlimited by the clause. It should, the ref ore., be concluded 
that the word ''trade" as used in paragraph 3 should be given 
a more exte.nded meaning· than the s-ame word as used in para-
graph 1. 
page 47 ~ It is determined, Congress intends by the Sher-
man Act to exert all the power it possessed in re-
spect to the subject matter trade and co;mmerce, it is equally 
reasonable to con.elude the Congress intended to include all 
territories to which its power might extend. The same reason 
which requires the -utmost liberalitv of construction in respect . 
to the word ''trade'' also requires the same de~;ree of liberali-
ties of constitution in respect to the word territories; ancl we 
hold, accordingly that the word territory was used in its most 
comprehensive sense, as embracing· all organized territories 
whether incorporated into the United States or not including 
Puerto Rico. 
To go further as to wh.ether dependents of a native of 
Puerto Rico who was killed in Virginia. residing; in Puerto 
Rico, are citizens of and residin~ in the U11ited States within 
the meaning of Section 39 of the Workmen's Compensation 
Law which reads in part, as· follows : 
"If the employee does not leave dependents, citizens of 
and residing at the time of the accident in the United States 
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or Dominion of Canada, the amount of compensation shall not 
in any case exceed one thousand dollars.'' 
In order for a dependent residing in Puerto Rico to receive 
benefits., therefore, it must be shown that he is a (1) citizen of 
the United States; and (2) that he was residing in the United 
States or the Dominion of Canada ::it the time of the acci-
dent. 
Under the Act of Congress of October 14, 1940, c. 876, title 
I, S. C. II, sec. 202, 54 Stat. 1139, U. S. title 8, sec. 602, the de-
pendents in Puerto Rico are citizens of the United States if 
· they meet the conditions set forth therein. This section pro-
vides: 
page 48 ~ '' All persons born in Puerto Rico on or after 
April 11, 1899, subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States, residing on the effective date of this Act in 
Puerto Rico or other territory over which the United States. 
exercises rights of sovereignty and not citizens of the Unitecl 
States under any other Act,' are hereby declared to be citizens 
of the United States.'' 
Section 39 of the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act 
was enacted on March 21, 1918. The Virginia Code of 1919, 
Vol. 1, title 2, sec. 5, provides : 
"In the construction of this Code, and of all Statutes, the 
following rules shall be observed unless such construction 
would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legisla-
ture. 
"First, 'State,' 'United States.' The word 'State' when 
applied to a part of the United States, shall be construed to 
extend to and include the District of Columbia and the several 
territories so-called., and the words 'United States' shall be 
construed to include the said district and territories.'' 
This section also appears as section 5 of the title 2 of the 
Virginia Code of 1942. 
"United States" for many purposes associated with the 
use of that term in the Federal Constitution, has been given 
a restricted meaning. In a series of cases it has been held 
that "United States'' in the constitutional sense 
page 49 ~ would not include a non-incorporated territory, such 
as Puerto Rico. Ba.lzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U. S. 
298, 305. The fact that a considerable number of Federal stat-
utes specifically define ''United States'' as including all ter-
ritories and possessions subject to its dominion and jurisdic-
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tion indicates that the term is susceptible of meanings other 
than that applied in connection with constitutional issues. 
(See argument of Solicitor General for United States in De 
Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, 143, in which four meanings ~f 
the term are set forth). In any. event, "United States" as 
used in the Virginia statutes comprehends "territories'' and 
it is well settled that Puerto Rico is a territory. Fourteen 
Dia.mond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176. It woµld ap-
pear, therefore, that residence in a territory of the United 
States., such as Puerto lUco, for the purposes of Section 39 
of the 1Vorlrmen 's Compensation Law constitutes residence 
in the United States. 
RECAPITULATION. 
By the above quoted authorities it is found: 
1. That the term United States includes all territories sub-
.ject to the jurisdiction as the Federal Government. 
2. That Puerto Rico is a domestic territory belonging to the 
United States. 
3. That Puerto Ricans are American citizens and are en-
titled to all rights, privileges and immunities as such. 
4. That the organization of Puerto Rico is similar in many 
respects to the organization of the several states. 
5. That the term United States as used in See-
page 50 ~ tion 39 of the ,vorkmen's Compensation Law of 
Virginia has a broader meaning and include~ the 
. term Puerto Rico. 
The question of dependency is one that has to be determined 
upon the evidence we have submitted by the employee and 
aftrwards by the evidence taken upon the request of the em-
ployer, together with a statement filed, all of which is to be 
determined upon the evidence of Juan Cruz Molina, who is 
the fathe~ of the deceased. To get a better view of the case 
is to quote from a translation as follows: 
'' My name is ,Juan Cruz Molina, am over 21 years old ( 46 
years), a widower, cobbler by trade and resident of Ward 
Sabana, in the municipality of Guaynabo, Puerto Rico. 
That the name of mv decedent wife was Dolores Maisonet 
whom I married in San Juan, Puerto Rico in the year 1918 
and that two children were born to her, one named Juan 
Francisco and the other Carlos. 
That Juan Francisco left for the United States in the year 
1940 and while there used to write me weekly; that he worked 
in a toy factory, also joined the regular army of the United 
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States 'having been discharged therefrom owing to physical 
reasons, that he also was employed on board a steamer plying 
between the United States and South America and that shortly 
before his death he worked for the Alphonse Chimney Con-
struction Company for whom he had already worked down 
here in Puerto Rico at the time said Company had a contract 
for the construction of the smoke stack of the cement factory 
in Catano. 
That he was acquainted with the death of his son Juan 
Francisco through a cablegram sent to him by the Company 
for whom his son was working; that although he 
page 51 ~ cabled said Company expressing his wish that the 
body of his son be sent- down to be buried in Puerto 
Rico, no reply was ever received; that subsequently he was 
informed through a cablegram received from Mrs. Angelina 
Rodriguez that the body had been delivered to her but that 
she had no funds with which to pay the undertaker; that the 
undersigned authorized by cable that the burial be made by 
l\fonjr Funeral Parlors of New York; that the burial was 
taken care of by said undertakers and that they have sent 
him a bill amounting to $130.00 which is still outstanding·. · 
That decedent bad no other heirs with the exception of the-
undersigned and decedent's brother, Carlos Cruz Maisonet, 
20 years old, electrician helper, who lives with the under-
signed. 
That although the undersigned has not remarried he llas 
four other children nam~d Socorro, 10 years old, Raf ae1, 6 
years old, Hector Manuel, 5 years old and ~fanuel,, 2 years 
old, born out of wed-lock. 
That my son Juan Francisco always did provide me with 
funds out of his salary in approximately $12.00 a month. 
That Juan Francisco was single and that his only heirs are 
the undersigned as father and his brother Carlos. 
That the undersigned has taken certain steps in connection 
with this matter through the Puerto Rico Chapter of the 
.American Red Cross. 
That the foregoing is a free and unsolicited statement of 
the above mentioned facts in connection with this matter. 
Signed at San Juan, Puerto Rico, the thirteenth 
page 52 ~ day of November, 1942. 
(Signed) JUAN CRUZ MOLINA." 
In the judgment of the Hearing Commissioner this is the 
most liberal evidence in behalf of the employer. ·while it is 
admitted by counsel for the employer that there is a 20 per 
cent dependency ( see brief), the evidence in this case shows. 
that claimant was paying ~or a house at the rate of $5.00 per 
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month and that he. was receiving from his own earnings $5.00 
a week, which would amount to $20.00, or a total of $25.00, so 
far as he was concerned, and that his· evidence showed the 
main contribution fro mthe deceased son was $12.00 a week., 
or $48.00, making a total of $73.00 per month received of 
which there was paid by the son $48.00, showing that the de-
pendency was to the extent of 48/73 of total dependency. It 
must be clearly understood that no evidence was introduced 
by t4e defendant to contradict the statements as previously 
given in his written statement or deposition heretofore quoted, 
which was introduced as evidence for the defendant. It is 
found that the claimant is 48/73 dependent upon the deceased. 
In addition to the award of dependency, the defendant will 
pay the burial expenses as well as all court costs. 
An award will be made putting into effect the above. 
The claimant was represented by Albert W. Richman, At-
torney-at-Law, New York City, who had engaged services of 
counsel in Puerto Rico for the taking of depositions tog·ether 
with cost of same, and a fee is allowed of $500.00 to be de-
ducted out of the aforesaid award. 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA 
RICHMOND 14 
NOTICE OF AWARD 
Claim No. 633-043. 
Case of : Juan Francisco Cruz 
(deceased) 
Accident 8-3-42. 
TO: Alphonse Custodis Chim-
ney Const. Co. (Employer) 
80 Peroat Street 
New York City. 
AND: Juan Cruz Molina 
(Claimant) 
Box 72 
Catano, Porto Rico 
AND: U. S. Fidelity & Guar-
anty Co. (Insurance Car-
rier) 
701 Law Building 
Richmond, Virginia. 
DATE: May 11, 1944. 
Albert vV. Richman, 
Attorney R 
11 Park Place 
New York City. 
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You are hereby notified that a hearing was held in the above 
styled case before Deans, Commissioner, by means of state-
ments made and depositions taken on behalf of all the parties 
of interest, and a decision rendered on May 11, 1944., direct-
ing an award of compensation in favor of the partial de-
pendent of the deceased employee, as follows: 
To Juan Cruz Molina, $11.84 per week payable every four 
weeks beginning August 3, 1942, and to continue for a period 
of three hundred weeks, unless subsequent conditions require 
a modification. 
page 54 ~ In addition to the compensation, the defendant 
will pay the burial expenses as well as all court 
costs. 
To Attorney Albert vV. Richman the sum of $500.00 is di-
rected to be paid covering professional services rendered 
claimant in the prosecution of his claim, and to be deducted 
from the compensation above awarded. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA 
( Signed) vV. H. NICKELS, JR. 
Attest: 
(Signed) W. F. BURSEY, 
Secretary. 
Chairman. 
page 55 ~ Juan Francisco Cruz (deceased)., Employee; J ua11 
Cruz Molina, Claimant, 
v. 
Alphonse Custodis Chimney Construction Company, Em-
ployer, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, In-
surer. 
Claim No. 633-043. 
No one appeared for the claimant. 
George B. ·white for the defendant. 
June 7, 1944. 
Review "before the full Commission, at Richmond, Virginia, 
May 29, 1944. 
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Nickels, Chairman., rendered the opinion. 
On review, the full Commission, upon the facts proved in 
this case, affirms and adopts the findings of fact of May 11, 
1944, and the award thereupon entered on that date. 
On consideration whereof the application for a review is 
dismissed from the docket. 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA 
RICHMOND 14 
NOTICE OF A WARD 
Claim No. 633-043. 
Case of : Juan Francisco Cruz 
(deceased) 
Accident 8-3""42. 
TO : .Alphonse Custodis Chim-
ney Const. Co. (Employer) 
80 Peroat Street 
New York City. 
AND: Juan Cruz Molina 
(Claimant) 
Box 72 
Catano, Porto Rico 
AND: U. S. Fidelitv & Guar-
anty Co. (Insurance Car-
rier) 
701 Law Building 
Richmond, Virginia. 
DATE: May 11, 1944. 
(June 7, 1944) 
Albert W. Richman, 
Attorney R 
11 Park Place 
New York City. 




You arc hereby notified that a Review was held in the above 
styled case before the full Commission at Richmond, Virginia, 
on May 29, 1944, and a decision rendered (June 7., 1944), May 
11, 1944, adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
of the hearing Commissioner as those of the full Commission 
on Review and affirming· the Commission's award of May 11, 
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1944, directing compensation in favor of the dependent father 
of the deceased employee. 
Attest: 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA 
(Signed) W. H. NICKELS, JR. 
Chairman. 
(Signed) W. F. BUR.SEY, 
Secretary. 
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mission of Virginia, hereby certify that the fore-
going, according· to the records of this office, is a true and cor-
rect copy of statement of findings of fact., conclusions of law 
and other matters pertinent to the question at issue in Claim 
No. 633-043, Juan Francisco Cruz (Deceased), Employee, 
J nan Cruz Molina, Claimant, versus Alphonse Custodis Chim-
ney Construction Company, Employer,. United States Fi-
delity and Guaranty Company, Insurer. 
I further certify that Juan Cruz Molina., through counsel:-
was notified that the Alphonse Custodis Chimney Construc-
tion Company and United States Fidelity and Guaranty Com-
pany did request the Secretary of the Industrial Commission 
of Virginia to furnish certified copy of the record, including-
the evidence, for the purpose of an ~ppeal to the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
I further certify that, as evidenced by United States Postal 
Registry return receipt card, counsel representing the em-
ployer and its insur~nce carrier received on June 8, 1944, 
copy of award of the Industrial Commission of Virginia, 
dated May 11, 1944. (June 7, 1944). 
Given under my hand and seal of the Industrial Commis-
sion o! Virginia this the 17th day of June, 1944. 
(Seal) W. F. BURSEY, 
Secretary 
Industrial Commission of Virginia. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C .. 
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